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Abstract
The growing popularity of national e¤orts to promote eco-labeling raises important
questions. In particular, developing countries fear that the eco-label can deliberately im-
pose the environmental concern of (high income) importing countries on their production
methods. Yet, empirical studies of the adoption of eco-labelling schemes at the cross-
country level are scarce due to the lack of data availability. In this paper, the decision
to introduce an eco-label is analyzed through a heteroskedastic Bayesian spatial probit,
which allows the governments decision to introduce an eco-label to be inuenced by
the behaviour of the neighbouring countries. The estimation is performed by extending
the joint updating approach proposed by Holmes & Held (2006) to a spatial framework.
Empirical evidence highlights the importance of a high stage of development, innovation
experience and potential scale e¤ects in the implementation of an eco-label scheme. In
addition, results conrm the existence of a strategic interdependence in the eco-label
decision.
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1 Introduction
"Eco-labels" is the short form for ecological labels. They contain information regarding po-
tential impacts on the environment of the production, consumption and waste phases of the
products/services consumed. However, eco-labelling schemes are not just messages about
a product or a service but claims stating that it has particular properties or features (Ma-
son, 2006). In fact, even the instrument of labelling itself is a claim, as it refers to certain
characteristics of the procedure under which the label is awarded. The very own existence
of eco-labels arises when rms have information on the environmental impact of the prod-
uct that consumers value but cannot check. Buyers are unable to verify the environmental
consequence of the goods before the purchase or through frequent purchase. This type of
information asymmetry, also known as credence feature, is due to the temporal, spatial
and non-exclusion characteristics of most environmental impacts. In addition, the environ-
mental degradation (or improvement) generated by the environmental characteristics of the
conventional (or eco-friendly) product displays properties of public goods showing either non-
excludability or non-rivalry in the consumption. This usually implies a free riding problem as
well as an assurance problem. Moreover, no market prices prevail to really reect the value
of the production and consumption externalities of the product. These public good features
lead to a misallocation of scarce resources because the decision-making process does not take
into account all the costs.
According to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the type of eco-
labelling considered in this study is called type I labels1 . This category of eco-labels is
owned and operated by third parties, which may be governmental organizations or private
non-commercial entities, and is awarded for products and manufacturing processes which
meet certain environmental criteria. The rms participation is completely voluntary. In-
deed, manufacturers must pay for the right to display the label and demonstrate continued
adherence to relevant product guidelines to maintain their certications. This type of market
based instruments seeks to fulll two objectives:
1. provide consumers with more information about the environmental e¤ects of their con-
sumption, (i.e. transform the products credence attribute into a search attribute),
which should generate a move towards more environmentally friendly consumption
patterns;
1 ISO distinguishes two additional categories of ecolabels. Type II is associated with informative envi-
ronmental self-declaration claims which are not veried by any independent third party. Type III covers
voluntary programs that provide quantied environmental data of a product, under pre-set categories of pa-
rameters set by a qualied third party and based on life cycle assessment, and checked by that or another
qualied third party.
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2. encourage economic agents (mainly rms and governments) to increase the environ-
mental standards of products/services by benchmarking environmental performance
(i.e. internalize the non-market benets of the eco-labelled good).
While most industrialized countries have adopted an eco-labelling scheme, African and
Latin American countries have yet to decide to implement this type of market-based initiative.
This very unequal di¤usion among countries has received considerable attention in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Although WTO rules exclude trade policy measures based solely
on di¤erent process and production methods, eco-labels are criticized for potentially imposing
the environmental concerns of (high income) importing countries on the production methods
of (low income) trading partners (Bonsi et al., 2008). If governments consider the eco-label
as a strategic environmental policy instrument, the decision to introduce an eco-label will
ultimately depend on how many and which countries are expected to adopt an eco-labelling
scheme. Thus, a country could deliberately implement this instrument policy in order to
protect local industries. Obviously this type of non-tari¤ barriers to trade is particularly
problematic for countries depending heavily on exports.
Despite this concern, most literature on eco-labels and its international trade linkages
takes a conceptual or descriptive approach due to the lack of data. To my knowledge, this
paper is one of the few to analyze empirically the linkages between eco-labelling and inter-
national trade in an interdependent world. To tackle the issue of interdependence, a spatial
probit model is estimated using a new Bayesian Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo algorithm. Fol-
lowing Holmes & Held (2006) I improve the performance of the spatial probit model sim-
ulation in terms of mixing and convergence by jointly updating the non spatial regression
parameters and the auxiliary variable (i.e. stochastic latent variable whose sign determines
the value taken by the limited dependent variable (1 or 0)). As far as I know, this is the
rst time that this type of joint sampling is done in a spatial Bayesian framework. Empirical
evidence conrms the role of the economys stage of development and innovation capacity in
the governments decision to introduce an eco-label. Moreover, results highlight the strategic
nature of the eco-labelling decision and a potential substitutive relationship between tari¤s
and eco-label. These results partially validate the view that the one of the underlying role
of the eco-label program might be to act as a technical trade barrier and serve protectionist
objectives.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical
background to eco-labels and their impact on international trade linkages. Section 3 describes
the spatial probit model as well as the joint sampling estimation method and its performance
in a small Monte-Carlo simulation study. Section 4 reviews the determinants in the eco-label
adoption and the empirical results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 checks the robustness
of the ndings. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Eco-label and International Trade Linkages
Although eco-labels based on voluntary Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) are neither covered
by the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement nor by the WTO, developing countries are
concerned about the discriminatory e¤ects caused by the implementation of the eco-labels2 .
This issue has been the object of a large theoretical and juridical literature, even before
famous trade disputes like the US restrictions on imports of non "dolphin-safe" tuna or
"turtle-safe" shrimps. Table 1 highlights the intended as well as unintended e¤ects associated
with the introduction of an eco-label.
Table 1: Eco-labels E¤ects
Intended E¤ects Unintended E¤ects
- Green Market Expansion - Protectionism Abuse
- Environmental Consciousness - Deterioration of Terms of Trade
- Investment Innovation - Innovation Distortion
- Oversupply of Eco-label
- Free Rider Problem
The launch of an eco-label program is expected to boost export earnings through products
di¤erentiation. It may also allow innovative rms to exploit at their fullest environmentally
friendly production methods. In developing countries, the introduction of an eco-labelling
scheme can potentially o¤er new opportunities to attract capital investment to expand envi-
ronmentally sustainable niche market.
2The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trades preamble states: ... no country should be prevented
from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or
plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers
appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised
restriction on international trade.
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However, unlike safety and health issues that tend to be relatively homogeneous across
countries, attitudes toward the environment may di¤er widely. This can lead to disagree-
ments between countries over the validity of a specic requirement (Beaulieu & Gaisford,
2002). Since demand for environmental quality tends to be income elastic, these di¤er-
ences in attitude are often greatest between high and low income countries. In particular,
less developed countries believe that domestic interests mainly dictate the product selection
process, and, thus, foreigner producers may be required to meet criteria that are not relevant
in their own country. This is particularly problematic for small and medium enterprises in
small resources constrained developing countries, as certication procedures and eco-labelling
compliance require important funding (Piotrowski & Kratz, 1999). Beside these costs, pro-
ducers in many low income countries face asymmetric information. They do not necessarily
possess information about some eco-label programs and know about all the certication re-
quirements. These obstacles are further exacerbated by the fact that advanced technologies
used to dene the standards of the eco-label might be patented and thus di¢ cult to access
if not una¤ordable. This becomes even more problematic when each developed country sup-
ports di¤erent underlying eco-labelling criteria making it almost impossible for the producers
to exploit economies of scales. The cost of complying with each eco-label program can ulti-
mately prevent developing countries to export their products to markets where an eco-label is
in place. This is an important issues for countries depending extensively on foreign trade as
well as economies which have to determine their strategic trade interests in order to sustain
potential economic growth.
Although countries are judicially independent, they are economically interdependent be-
cause of international trade. Each government may face strategic interdependence on its
national and export markets. Consequently, a country, which faces competitive challenges
from a large number of countries whose level of environmental policy di¤ers, will have some
incentives to change its environmental regulation in response to other countries policies.
The governmental decision to introduce an eco-labelling program can thus be seen as strate-
gic and depending on the decision of other countries (Basu et al., 2004). Two main re-
lated mechanisms can explain the strategic environment in adopting an eco-label. First,
a country, which faces competition from importers on its national market, might be will-
ing to introduce an eco-labelling scheme whose criteria may be determined, intentionally
or unintentionally, in favour of domestic rms. If domestic producers can adopt the eco-
label more easily than foreign rms due to the criteria established, this may cause unde-
sirable trade e¤ects or trade frictions. For instance, the introduction of an eco-labelling
program can increase the perceived quality of eligible domestic products and decreases that of
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noneligible imported product through market signalling3 . Therefore, one of the "protectionist-
like" e¤ects could result from consumers valuing cleaner production, and hence, switching
from the imported product to the domestically produced good once the standard becomes
known. This change in consumption spending in favour of the eco-label product can lead to a
decrease in the price of the eco-label product, which ultimately can reduce the trade volume
and worsens the terms of trade of the developing exporters. In addition, the lack of trans-
parency of the LCA process, notication and technical assistance can lead to higher costs of
production and operation for the foreigner producers, which ultimately could result in losing
competitive advantage (UNEP, 2005). Second, an exporting country, which is interested in
extending its foreign market share (presumably to high income countries), might also be in-
terested in adopting an eco-label program. Just like in the rst case, it is the determination
of the standards associated with the eco-label, rather than the information embodied in it,
that explains why eco-labelling a¤ects the market access to (developing) exporters.
Be that as it may, eco-labelling programs might still be a poor substitute for policies
such as tari¤s, that may be more mandatory, but less WTO compliant. The main reason
is that as the number of countries adopting eco-labels increases, existing consumers of eco-
labelled products can be tempted to free ride by reducing their own purchases (Mesler &
Robertson, 2005). Therefore, it is necessary to consider the extent to which eco-labels and
trade restrictions might be substitutable with respect to their impact on the environment in
an interdependent world. This is one of the objectives of this paper, which is achieved by
estimating a spatial probit model.
3 Joint Sampling in Bayesian Heteroskedastic Spatial
Probit Model
Assuming that each country assesses the costs and benets of adopting an eco-label, a ratio-
nal government will introduce an eco-labelling scheme only if it gains in welfare, expressed in
monetary terms or net gain in utility4 . Formally, Y?i denotes country is welfare associated
with the adoption of the eco-label. Note that Y?i is by denition a latent or auxiliary variable
3For instance, the share of eco-labelled paper for notebooks in the swedish and danish market has increased
over time to about 80%.
4Most theoretical papers focusing on the labelling procedure considers an authority that maximizes a
social surplus which depends on the prots of the rms, the consumerssurplus, the environmental damage
associated with the production of the good as well as other potential costs related to the introduction of the
eco-label (Greaker, 2006).
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and thus cannot be observed directly. What is observable is the binary indicator variable
Yi with entry 1 if the country has adopted an eco-label (Y?i > 0) and 0 otherwise (Y
?
i < 0).
As explained in the previous section, a governments decision to introduce an eco-label may
depend on the related decision of other close countries. Yet, assuming incorrectly that the
decision of country i is independent of the decision of the N   1 remaining countries leads
to biased as well as inconsistent and ine¢ cient estimates which voids subsequent hypothesis
testing (LeSage & Pace, 2009). That is why the latent variable is specied as a spatial
autoregressive probit model5 :
Y? = WY? + X + u (1)
Y = 1 [Y? > 0]
u  N  0; 2V
V = diag (v1; v2; :::; vN )
where Y?, Y and u are N  1 vectors. The parameter , also known as the spatial lag, is
associated with the non-negative row-standardized exogenous NN matrix W. This spatial
weight matrix, whose diagonal elements are zero, determines the form of the interdependence
across country-pairs. This spatial autoregressive parameter can be seen as a reaction function
which relates a countrys choice about whether to introduce an eco-label to the existence of
an eco-label in spatially close economies. Additional K explanatory variables are included
in the N  K matrix X. To account for potential spatial heterogeneity and outliers, the
variance of the error terms, V, is not constant. Following LeSage (1997, 2000), I introduce
a set of variance scalars (v1; v2; :::; vN ) as unknown parameters to be estimated. This is
important, because if a given country follows a di¤erent pattern than the majority of the
spatial observations, the errors would no longer be normally distributed (i.e. fat-tailed errors
associated with a Student-t distribution). The associated parameter estimates would thus
be inconsistent if this were not accounted for.
Methods for properly estimating and analyzing equation (1) have recently been the ob-
ject of a relative large body of research in the spatial econometrics literature. The issue
is that the introduction of the spatial lag leads to simultaneity biases as well as additional
heteroskedasticity in the error terms. The reduced form of expression (1) highlights this
issue:
Y? = (I   W) 1 (X + u) (2)
5As highlighted by LeSage & Pace (2009), the cross-sectional spatially autocorrelated lag model, which is
related to the spatiotemporal model, provides a long term perspective.
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The heteroskedasticity as well as the spatial dependence in the error term render stan-
dard probit approach inappropriate (cov

(I   W) 1 u

= 2 (I   W) 1 V (I   W0) 1).
In fact, the presence of spatial autocorrelation makes the traditional maximum likelihood
method less practical. The main reason is that the likelihood function requires to evaluate
the joint distribution of the N interdependent outcomes, which is not the product of the N
marginal distributions, but involves N -dimensional integration and the determinant of the
N N matrix W. To see this point more formally, the likelihood function of equation (1) is
expressed as follows:
L
 
; ; 2;V; Y?;W

=
 
2
 N=2 jIN   Wj V 1 exp   1
22
u0V 1u

(3)
=  N
NQ
i=1
(1  i)
NQ
i=1
v
  12
i exp
"
 
NX
i=1
u2i
22vi
#
where ui is the ith element of the error vector u = (IN   W) Y?   X. Note that the
determinant of the Jacobian jI   Wj is approximated by Ni=1 (1  i) with i representing
the ith eigenvalue of the matrix W.
To avoid the direct calculation of multiple integrals in the likelihood function,which can
be analytically intractable, several estimators have been proposed (Fleming, 2004; Franzese
& Hays, 2008). McMillen (1992) is the rst to suggest an Expectation-Maximization (EM)
algorithm. His approach consists of replacing the discrete dependent variable with the ex-
pectation of the underlying continuous latent variable and maximizing its likelihood function
until convergence is reached. Yet, this method faces several drawbacks (LeSage, 2000). First,
the EM algorithm does not provide standard-error for the spatial lag. Second, the method
requires an arbitrary parameterization of the heteroskedasticity caused by the introduction
of spatial dependence. Third, the approach is highly computation intensive when the num-
ber of cross-sections is large. To address the issue of spatial heteroskedasticity, Case (1992)
proposes an alternative estimator that groups each cross-section into regions whose errors
are assumed to be strictly independent of each other. Instead of expressing the spatial dis-
crete choice model as a maximum likelihood function, Pinkse & Slade (1998), among others,
derive the necessary moments conditions and apply a two-step Generalized Method of Mo-
ments estimator. Both Case (1992) and Pinkse & Slade (1998) approaches ignore standard
cross-section heteroskedasticity making them consistent but not necessarily e¢ cient estima-
tors. More recently, Beron et al. (2003) extend the Recursive-Importance-Sampling (RIS)
method to estimate consistently the spatial probit and compute the associated standard-
errors
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necessary for inference. The main disadvantage of this simulation method is its computational
burden, which makes it less practical to account for heteroskedasticity in the error term6 . To
address all of these issues, LeSage (2000) extends the Bayesian Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo
(MCMC) method to a spatial discrete choice model by using the Metropolis-Hastings-within-
Gibbs sampling approach. The rst advantage of the Bayesian strategy is to be able to derive
the condition distribution of each parameter, and thus compute di¤erent moments of the
distribution (e.g. mean, standard-error,...). The second advantage is its exibility to account
for the heteroskedasticity in the error terms. That is why equation (1) will be estimated
using the Bayesian MCMC approach.
According to the Bayesian approach, the product of the likelihood function and the prior
density, which both depends on certain assumptions, determines the posterior distribution
of the parameters that ts the data best7 . Thus, in order to estimate the set of parame-
ters , V and  their associated priors ( ()) have to be specied independently of each
other. First, the explanatory variables are assigned a normal prior,  () v N (c; s). Sec-
ond, in order to account for heteroskedastic variance 2vi, the relative variance parameters,
V = diag (v1; v2; :::; vN ), are assumed to follow an independent 2 (r) =r distribution, which
depends on the single parameter r,  (r=vi) v iid 2 (r), i = 1; :::; N . The constant  is
usually set to 1. Third, the spatial lag is assumed to be distributed according to an uni-
form distribution,  () v U
 
 1min; 
 1
max

, where  1min and 
 1
max represent, respectively, the
minimum and maximum eigenvalues of the matrix W. Another alternative is to assumed a
beta prior for the spatial autoregressive parameter  () v ß(b; b) (LeSage & Parent, 2007).
Based on these priors, LeSage (2000) extends the work of Albert & Chib (1993) and Geweke
(1993) to derive the conditional posterior distributions of the set of parameters:
p (j;V;Y;Y?)  N [C; S] (4)
C = S 1
h
X0V 1 (IN   W) Y?=2 + cs 1
i
S = X0V 1X=2 + s 1
p (vij; ;V i;Y;Y?) /
 
u2i =
2 + r

=vi (5)
p (j;V;Y;Y?) / jIN   Wj e ( 12
2)(u0V 1u) (6)
where / means that the expression on the left-hand side is proportional up to a constant to
the expression on the right-hand side. V i denotes all the elements of the matrixV beside vi.
Note that expression (6), the prior of the spatial lag, cannot be generated from a standard
6 In their empirical application, the estimation method proposed by Beron et al. (2003) does not rule out
explosive spatial dependence (b > 1) (see Table 4 p. 292), which can be problematic.
7See Holloway et al. (2002), Thomas (2007) or Lesage & Pace (2009) for a more thorougly introduction
of bayesian theory extented to the spatial probit.
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normal distribution- That is why the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, which is a standard
accept-reject algorithm, has to be used. In the case of the alternative beta prior, an univariate
numerical integration is applied to construct the conditional posterior distribution of the
spatial autoregressive term and then sample it by inversion (LeSage & Pace, 2009).
Finally, the posterior distribution of the latent/auxiliary variable, Y?, conditional on the
parameters is specied as a truncated multivariate normal distribution:
p (Y?j; ;V;Y)  N [; ] Ind (Y;Y?) (7)
 = (IN   W) 1 X
 =

(IN   W0) V 1 (IN   W)
 1
where Ind (Y;Y?) represents an indicator function which truncates from the left by zero
if Yi = 1 and from the right by zero if Yi = 0. Note that the marginal distribution of
the individual elements of Y?, p (Y?i j; ; ; vi;Yi), does not correspond to an univariate
truncated normal. LeSages method relies on the Geweke (1991) approach to sample the
conditional distribution for Y?i from a truncated multivariate normal distribution subject to
independent inequality linear constraints (LeSage & Pace, 2009)8 .
Once the complete conditional distributions of all parameters in the model are specied, the
MCMC sampling method can be implemented. While in standard Monte-Carlo simulation,
the draws are generated independently based on a specied underlying distribution, in Gibbs
sampler, each draw depends on the previous one in such a way that the produced samples
display properties identical to those of the joint population. Thus, LeSage (2001) suggests
taking iterative random draws from (4), followed by (5) and (6), and then (7). With a
su¢ cient number of draws, the sample statistics can approximate the set of estimates that
converges in the limit to the joint posterior distribution of the parameters.
However, the main drawback of LeSages iterative sampling method is the presence of
strong posterior correlation between , Y? and . Although a correlated draws chain provides
an unbiased picture of the distribution, the number of draws has to be su¢ ciently large. That
is why, in order to tackle the issue of potential slow mixing in the Markov chain, I follow
Holmes & Held (2006) and extends the joint updating of  and Y? to a spatial framework
by using the product rule to decompose the joint probability of  and Y? as follows:
p (;Y?j;V;Y) = p (Y?j;V;Y) p (j;V;Y;Y?)
8There are other methods to simulate a truncated multivariate variables subject to inequality linear
constraints, including Rodriguez-Yam, Davis & Scharf (2004) e¢ cient approach.
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The auxiliary variable is now updated according to its marginal distribution once it has been
integrated over  (see equation (4)):
p (Y?j;V;Y) / N [; 
] Ind (Y;Y?) (8)
 = (IN   W) 1 X

 = (IN   W) 1 [XsX0 + V] (IN   W0) 1
In other words, the proposed approach consists of sampling Y?i according to its marginal
multivariate truncated normal function (p
 
Y?i j;V;Y? i;Yi

) and updating s conditional
means (C) after each update to Y?i . Once all the individual elements of Y
? have been
sampled,  is generated based on its conditional normal distribution (4). More formally, the
new procedure consists of iteratively 9 :
1. updating f;Y?g jointly according to (8), given  and V;
2. updating V according to (5), given the remaining parameters;
3. updating  according to (6), given the remaining parameters.
Thanks to the joint updating approach, the mixing and sampling e¢ ciency in the chain
should be improved. In order to compare the performance between the standard iterative
sampler and the joint updating sampler, I conduct a small Monte-Carlo simulation study.
The latent variable Y? is generated according to equation (2) and used to determine the
values of Yi as follows: Yi = 1 if Y?i > 0 or Yi = 0 otherwise. The matrix of explanatory
variables includes a constant and two standard random normal variables. The coe¢ cient
vector is set to the following values:  = (0; 1; 1)0. The spatial weight matrix W is a
row-standardized rook-type matrix of order 10 (i.e. the ten nearest neighbors). The spatial
autoregressive parameter  is set to 0.75. For simplicity, the individual shocks are assumed
to follow a standard Gaussian distribution, whose variance is homoskedastic (u  N (0; IN )).
Four di¤erent sample sizes are considered: N = f250; 500; 750; 1000g.
For each of theses designs, 10 samples are generated and estimated according to 6 di¤erent
samplers:
1. iterative update with Geweke approach to simulate the latent variable and Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm to draw the spatial lag.
9The algorithm is written in Matlab and available upon request.
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2. iterative update with Geweke approach to simulate the latent variable and numerical
integration to draw the spatial lag.
3. iterative update with Rodriguez-Yam, Davis & Scharf approach to simulate the latent
variable and Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw the spatial lag.
4. iterative update with Rodriguez-Yam, Davis & Scharf approach to simulate the latent
variable and Metropolis-Hastings to draw the spatial lag.
5. joint update with Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw the spatial lag.
6. joint update with numerical integration to draw the spatial lag.
To my knowledge, this the rst time that the approach suggested by Rodriguez-Yam, Davis
& Scharf (2004) and the joint update have been applied to estimate a spatial probit. In order
to measure e¢ ciency, I compute, for each chain, the CPU computation time in seconds, the
parametersaverage Euclidean update distance between each iteration as well as the Raftery-
Lewis (1992, 1995) convergence statistic . A large value of Euclidean distance means good
mixing while a high total number of draws necessary to ensure an i.i.d chain implies high
autocorrelation in the chain and slow convergence.
Table 2 presents the results averaged over the four parameters ( and ) and the 10 runs.
First, the method proposed by Rodriguez-Yam et al. (2004) is more e¢ cient than Geweke
(1993) with higher mixing and faster convergence. Second, applying numerical integration
to draw the spatial lag improves also the mixing and usually reduces autocorrelation in the
chain. Third, although it is relatively more time consuming when the sample size is large,
the joint updating sampler yields a larger average distance jumped between iterations and
usually relies in smaller total draws. In fact, once the performances are standardized by
their respective computation time, the joint sampling algorithm relies on a 45% smaller total
number of draws to ensure convergence10 . In addition, in comparison to Geweke method,
the joint sampler yields 15 to 50% more mixing in the chain. Interestingly, Rodriguez-Yam
et al.s approach can lead to the same level of mixing than the joint updating method when
the number of cross-sections is particularly large. Overall, these ndings suggest that the
spatial probit model should be estimated by the joint update algorithm, especially when the
sample size is relatively small (as it is the case in this study).
10Appendix 8.A reports the relative performance of the iterative samplers with respect to the joint updating
sampler.
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Table 2: Algorithms Performance
Iterative Update with Iterative Update with
Geweke & Rodriguez-Yam et al. & Joint Update with
Metropolis-Hastings Metropolis-Hastings Metropolis-Hastings
CPU Total Param. CPU Total Param. CPU Total Param.
Observations Time Draws Distance Time Draws Distance Time Draws Distance
250 51 5268 0.145 37 4032 0.149 45 4164 0.192
500 176 5130 0.103 135 4209 0.106 170 3844 0.137
750 390 5172 0.083 313 4118 0.086 416 3947 0.111
1000 725 5160 0.072 585 3863 0.075 841 3816 0.096
Iterative Update with Iterative Update with
Geweke & Rodriguez-Yam et al. & Joint Update with
Numerical Integration Numerical Integration Numerical Integration
CPU Total Param. CPU Total Param. CPU Total Param.
Observations Time Draws Distance Time Draws Distance Time Draws Distance
250 55 5580 0.158 41 4065 0.163 49 3911 0.204
500 194 5164 0.112 153 3947 0.116 187 3916 0.145
750 444 5251 0.092 368 3813 0.095 469 3811 0.118
1000 839 5035 0.078 715 3770 0.081 956 3905 0.101
Once the model has been estimated, it is crucial to be able to interpret the coe¢ cients
(rst and second moments of the conditional distribution). Yet, just like in standard discrete
choice models, parameter estimates from a spatial probit cannot be interpreted directly. They
must be transformed to yield estimates of the marginal e¤ects, i.e. a change in the predicted
probability associated with changes in the explanatory variables. However, unlike classical
approaches, models including a spatial lag of the dependent variables have to be interpreted
in a special way (Beron & Vijverberg, 2004). This comes from the fact that a change in a
single country associated with a given explanatory variable will lead to a direct impact on the
country itself, but can potentially a¤ect all other countries indirectly. In fact, spatial probit
model allows for complex feedback loops that might take place when a shock in country i
a¤ects countries j and k to nally change back country i. The derivative of Yi with respect
to a variable r in country j; (j = 1; :::; i; :::N) takes the following form:
bijr  @E [YijXjr]
@Xjr
= 
h
(IN   bW) 1Xbi
i
=bsi h(IN   bW) 1i
ij
br=bsi
where  is the density function of a standard normal distribution and bsi = b2Pi b!2ij with
!ij being the ijth elements of the matrix (I   W) 1 u.
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Since it might be di¢ cult to keep track of the N2 K spatial e¤ect estimates, when the spatial
weight matrix size and the number of explanatory variables are large, LeSage & Pace (2009)
suggest some useful summary measures of these e¤ects for each explanatory variable r:
 Average Total E¤ect: bTr = 1N NP
i=1
NP
j=1
bijr.
 Average Direct E¤ect: bDr = 1N NP
i=1
biir.
 Average Indirect E¤ect: bIr = bTr   bDr .
Going back to the eco-label analysis, these impacts could be interpreted in the following
way. The direct e¤ect indicates how a rise in an explanatory variable across the sample of
countries would a¤ect the expected probability of the (average) country to adopt an eco-label
scheme. The indirect e¤ect measures how a shift in this explanatory variable would a¤ect the
(average) neighboring countrys eco-label program adoption decision. Obviously, the size of
these types of feedback will depend on the position and degree of connectivity of each country
with each other (spatial weight matrix W ), the strength of spatial dependence (spatial lag
) and the importance of the explanatory variables (parameters ).
4 Determinants of Eco-Label Adoption
As mentioned previously, the analysis of the e¤ect of eco-labels on trade ows su¤ers from
fundamental data deciencies (OECD, 2004). Because import and export statistics apply
di¤erent universal codes for tracking trade ows of eco-labelled and non-eco-labelled products,
there is no information available on international trade in eco-labelled products. That is
why this paper put the focus on governmental or quasi-governmental multi-sector eco-label
programs. Unlike one single product category label (e.g. canned tuna caught in a dolphin
safe way) or private eco-label (e.g. certied wood), the type of label considered here covers a
wide range of di¤erent manufactured products categories (e.g. Germanys Blue Angel). Data
on the adoption of a type I eco-label is taken from the Global Eco-labelling Network as well
as the New Zealands Ministry of Economic Development and the website ecolabelling.org.
Appendix 8.B reports the countries which have adopted a multi-sector eco-label before 200911 .
11Due to missing data, Liechtenstein, Malta, Singapore and Taiwan are not considered, although they have
an eco-label implemented. In addition, Costa Rica, South Africa, Turkey and Zimbabwe have introduced
a tourism eco-label. But since this type of eco-labelling focuses on non-traded goods, they are deliberately
omitted.
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Several authors have dened the potential determinants that could explain why a country
and producers would adopt an eco-label (Grolleau & El Harbi, 2008). Among them, Basu
et al. (2004) determine analytically and empirically the economic, trade and environmen-
tal variables under which governments and agricultural rms that apply green production
methods are favorably selected in the set of countries that adopt an eco-label program. They
also investigate the strategic interactions that prevail between trading partners in their de-
cision to adopt the eco-label. Based on their theoretical framework, which can be extended
to manufacturing industries, Figure 1 depicts the main incentives behind the governments
decision to introduce an eco-label. The perceived gains resulting from the adoption of an
eco-label are related to (1) the stage of development of the adopting country, (2) the xed
cost of the eco-labelling scheme, (3) the relative production cost advantage of the country
in producing the type of products covered by the eco-label program and (4) the strategic
interactions between trade competitors. The table in Appendix 8.E presents the di¤erent
factors and proxies as well as their sources considered in this paper.
Figure 1: Ecolabel Determinants
4.1 Economys Stage of Development
The decision to adopt an eco-label is mainly determined by the stage of development of the
economy. This is partially conrmed by Figure 2 which highlights the fact that most high
income countries were among the rst to introduce an eco-labelling scheme12 . In particular,
several governments decided to introduce an eco-label during the 1980s and early 1990s,
coinciding with the trend of market governance and self-regulation in environmental policy
instrument (away from command-and-control measures). In the recent years, the need to
address the issues related to global warming has lead to a renewed interest in eco-labelling
scheme.
12The peak in 1992 and 2004 correspond to the introduction and extension of the European eco-label
program, EU(15) and EU(25), respectively. Note that several european countries (e.g. Germany (Blue Angel),
Netherlands (Stichting Mileukeur), ...) introduced an eco-label program before the UE Flower ecolabel. For
those cases, only the rst eco-label scheme introduced is considered (see Appendix 8.B).
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Figure 2: Eco-label Adoption Evolution over Time
According to the environmental Kuznet curve representation, as the economy becomes
richer, individuals are more aware of environmental issues and ask for stringer regulation in
order to reduce and reverse the environmental pollution trend resulting from industrialization.
Countries that face more social problems (e.g. high unemployment rate, child mortality rate,
wage inequality, ...), all things being equal, are more likely to assign a low degree of concern
for environmental issues, reducing the probability of introducing an eco-labelling scheme.
More generally, based on classic economic theory, market-based instruments like eco-
labelling scheme are more likely to be implemented by e¢ cient governments than command-
and-control standards. Moreover, if the threat of direct environmental policy regulation on
the environmental quality of the product is high, producers might support more strongly
the introduction of an eco-labelling scheme. All other things being equal, the probability to
introduce an eco-label program will decrease as the economy is characterized by high ine¢ -
ciency and corruption preventing private sector from any voluntary environmental initiatives.
Somehow related to the issue of corruption, democratic governments with high political free-
dom can support more easily environmental quality improvement measures through voters
preferences (Magnani, 2000) and thus increase the odds of introducing an eco-label program.
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4.2 Cost of Eco-label
Several reasons can lead a rm to opt to be a member of an eco-label program (e.g. improved
corporate reputation, risks mitigation and management, competitive advantage, access to new
markets, cost reductions in the long run, . . . ). Ultimately, the producerss decision is based
on comparing two options (Sedjo et al., 2002):
- the extent to which the eco-label would increase the production costs (i.e. investment
costs to comply with the eco-labels standards (indirect costs) and administrative costs
associated with the eco-labelling procedure (direct costs));
- the extent to which consumers are willing to pay a price premium for eco-labelled
products (i.e. predictability of the producersfuture revenues).
Firms in large domestic markets will be able to dampen the xed cost to be paid to be
certied by a third party through economies of scale and improved learning curves. These
elements play a key role in the development of di¤erentiated goods (Bruce & Laroiya, 2007).
As highlighted by Nadai (1999), the rms eco-label adoption strategy is partially deter-
mined by the degree of heterogeneity between the sets of products sold. In addition, before
the market phase, the government might face the opposition of some rms in the industry
during the negotiation of the eco-labels criteria. These rms might want to try to block the
agreement on the criteria or, if these criteria are nonetheless adopted by the authority, they
can deliberately avoid the use of a label on their products.
Consumer sensitivity to the environment, which is related to the countrys stage of de-
velopment, is also essential for eco-labelling programs to be e¤ective. In fact, the proportion
of environmentally concerned consumers in the economy and their willingness to pay for
public good characteristics increase the probability to adopt an eco-label. Results from a
number of studies (Teisl et al., 1999; Sammer et al., 2006) suggest that two of the ma-
jor reasons why consumers choose eco-labelled products are consideration for the environ-
ment and/or for their own health. Several demographic and economic characteristics play
a role in determining eco-friendly behaviors. For instance, younger and more educated in-
dividual usually display a lower information processing cost and thus are assumed to be
more proactive in terms of environmental quality requests. In particular, the level of the
green premium price is stimulated if consumers are already environmentally conscious and
able to express their preferences through their environmentally friendly consumption choices.
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In addition, countries characterized by larger population densities are usually in need of
a better environmental quality, because the lives of more people are a¤ected by pollution.
Yet, the relationship between attitudes and behaviors with respect to the environment is
not simple and straightforward. The reason is that consumers are often dealing with mixed
motives13 .
4.3 Relative Production Cost Advantage
In order to be awarded an eco-label on their products, rms have to invest more in environ-
mentally sound technologies. This suggests that the criteria of the eco-labelling scheme will
implicitly orient rmsR&D. In fact, eco-label regulators expect that producers will achieve
innovation during the market phase in order to respect the criteria. Therefore, the di¤u-
sion of eco-organizational innovations can ultimately improves the relative production cost
advantage of an economy in producing di¤erent products (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995).
Innovative industries will then be more inclined to support policy instruments that promote
innovation. One can expect this mechanism to be even stronger, if producers are already fa-
miliar with environmental innovations (e.g. standard-setting, certication and accreditation
procedures), reducing the cost of the negotiation and market phases of the eco-label program.
However, the introduction of an eco-labelling scheme might also lead to innovation distor-
tions. In particular, during the eco-label criteria negotiation, producers may try to ensure
that the standards would rely on the current technology they possess, ensuring the lowest en-
vironmental innovation costs as possible. Once the eco-labelling scheme is in place, producers
might have no additional incentive to innovate beyond the eco-labels standards, even when
they enjoy a larger prot margin in the market. Distortion might be further exacerbated by
exporting rms desiring to comply with the WTOs rule of non-product related process and
production methods and thus dissuading them from investing in greener technologies.
13Several explanations have been provided, such as the "warm glow e¤ect" (i.e. increased utility from the
act of giving rather than receiving) or the "Veblen e¤ect" (increase utility associated with the statut value
given by the consumption) versus an excessive premium price charged or a lack of trust in the eco-labelled
product (Peattie, 2001; Pedersen & Neergaard, 2006).
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4.4 Strategic Interactions with Trade Competitors
The emergence of environmental demands in export markets is more likely to be important
in open economies. Since environmental attributes are unobservable, an eco-labelling scheme
can serve as a screening mechanism or a signalling device. That is one of the reason why
developing countries are concerned with the possible manipulation of eco-label standards as
a non-tari¤ barrier in disguise. From this point of view, the adoption of an eco-label scheme
can be seen as a substitute to a tari¤ system. As far as I know, this substitutive relationship
has yet to be investigated empirically.
If an eco-labelling scheme is considered as a potential strategic environmental policy, then
the decision to introduce an eco-label program can be seen as the outcome of a reaction
function of the other countriesbehavior. More specically, the interdependence in the eco-
label adoption relies on two hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: As a leader (follower), a countrys incentive to adopt an eco-label is
negatively (positively) a¤ected by the absence (existence and future
existence) of eco-label programs in other countries.
Hypothesis 2: This eco-label adoption interdependence increases with high econo-
mic relationship intensity and decreases with large trade cost.
To account for the existence of a peer e¤ect a spatial lag term () is thus included in the
model specication. In order to avoid any endogeneity issue in the estimation process, the
interdependence of the spatial autoregressive parameter is based on a geographical distance
weighting scheme (W), which is by denition strictly exogenous. The benchmark spatial
weight matrix is based on a negative exponential distance measure:
wij =
8<: exp
 distanceij
500

if i 6= j
0 if i = j
where distanceij is the bilateral geographical distance between the capital of country i and j.
The advantage of this spatial scheme is to give a positive weight to countries which are close
to each other (within a region) and almost zero weight to nations that are geographically
remote from each other. Note that the spatial weight is row-standardized so that the sum of
each row is equal to one.
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5 Empirical Results
The selection of the explanatory variables is mainly dictated by their availability in order
to maximize the number of countries in the sample (N = 141). The table in appendix 8.D
lists the countries considered in this paper. In order to reduce multicollinearity issues, I
deliberately restrict the number of explanatory variables. Multicollinearity leads to technical
issues and convergence problems. The tables in appendix 8.F and G report the descriptive
statistics of the variables, the Morans spatial autocorrelation statistic as well as the correla-
tion matrix. As suspected, the eco-label dummy variable displays signicant positive spatial
autocorrelation. The same is true for the remaining variables considered in this study. This
denitively calls for a spatial framework.
Before implementing the joint updating MCMC algorithm, several decisions have to be
made. These include the values for the priorsparameters, the number of total iterations, the
number of initial burn-in to be discarded and the spacing between iterations to be retained
for the inference14 . In fact, it is important to determine whether the sampling chain has
converged to a stationarity distribution. So the question is what is the number of runs until
the Markov chain approaches stationarity. According to Raftery and Lewis (1992, 1995)
diagnostic statistics and autocorrelation measures, the estimation relies on a Monte Carlo
chain which is based on at least 15; 000 draws with 1; 000 burn in draws and a thinning factor
of at least 5. The main reason to ignore 1; 000 draws is to make sure that there is no systematic
information left in the random numbers generation process for the remaining draws. In
addition, only every 5th draw is saved for inference in order to reduce autocorrelation and
avoid unjustied higher standard deviation in the parameters. If the chain for each parameter
were to display high autocorrelation, further draws from the chain should be skipped in order
to get proper inference on the standard deviation.
For each spatial specication, the average coe¢ cientsposterior and its associated standard
errors are reported in the rst column. The estimated parameterst-statistics are not com-
puted. The main reason is that normalization by standard errors does no longer leads to a
Student distribution, because the simulated draws are themselves approximation to Student
distributions (Holloway et al., 2002)15 . In addition, as suggested by LeSage & Pace (2009),
the second to fourth columns report the average marginal direct, indirect and total e¤ect,
respectively. But rst, I estimate the model assuming there is no spatial dependence in the
eco-label decision in a homoskedastic framework. Table 3 reports the main results.
14Unless specied otherwise, the priors settings are set as follows:  () v N
 
0; IN  1e12

;
 () v ß(1:01; 1:01) ; and  (4=vi) v iid 2 (4), i = 1; :::; N .
15Here, a parameter is signicant at the 5 percent signicance level, if the quantiles at the 2.5 and 97.5
percent have the same sign, i.e. zero does not belong to the 95% interval.
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The traditional probit estimator performs relatively poorly. Most variables are not sig-
nicant at the conventional level, except the number of international environmental treaties
adopted, the share of high technology exports and the number of ISO14001 certicates. The
presence of large standard errors might be due to the strong assumption of homosedasticity
in the error term and a potential variable omission when spatial dependence is not accounted
for. These issues are addressed by estimating an heteroskedastic spatial probit model. Ac-
cording to di¤erent convergence checks instruments, the di¤erent Monte Carlo chains have
reached stationarity16 . In particular, the dependence statistic I, which reports the ratio of
the total number of draws required to achieve a 5 percent test accuracy and the minimum
number of draws needed to ensure an identically and independently distributed draws, is
lower than 5 (I = 1:93). Therefore additional draws are not required and proper inference
can thus be performed.
Once interdependence in the eco-label adoption is taken into account, the results improve
signicantly. In fact, although not necessary signicant at the conventional level, most para-
meters display the expected sign. In particular, countries which have reached a high stage of
development are more likely to adopt an eco-label. This is conrmed by the fact that GDP
a¤ects positively the environmental label decision. As the economy growths, the government
has the incentive and the means to introduce an eco-labelling scheme. Interestingly, the
pollution pressure capture by emissions of SO2 decreases the probability of implementing an
eco-label scheme. This counterintuitve result might be due to three reasons. First, several
high income countries are large SO2 emitters despite possessing an eco-labelling scheme (e.g.
Switzerland or Sweden) and low income countries without eco-label generate even higher
levels of SO2 emissions (e.g. Mali or Nigeria). Second, most environmental labellings cover
products in industries characterized with relatively low SO2 emissions (e.g. footwear or
textile)17 . Third, since the SO2 emissionsimpact on the environmental and health is rel-
atively local, the need of direct regulation can be higher and the government might prefer
command-and-control measures instead of self-enforcement instruments. This nding can be
linked to Mattoo & Singh (1994) and Swallow and Sedjo (2000)s theoretical results, who
show that in some circumstances the labelling scheme could lead to an adverse e¤ect on the
environment by stimulating the production of unlabeled products through a substitution ef-
fect when the environmentally friendly production exceeds the demand and the relative price
of labelled goods increases. Going back to the estimation results, the existence of scale e¤ect,
16 In order to check the convergence of the MCMC samplers, autocorrelation, Raftery-Lewis and Geweke
diagnostics have been performed. To save space, they are not reported here but are available upon request.
17The non-ferrous metals, petroleum, non-metallic mineral and chemical products are associated with large
level of SO2 emissions (see Emission Data Base for Global Atmospheric Research).
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captured by the manufacture value added share, increases the probability. In other words,
if the costs associated with the eco-label procedure can be compensated by economies of
scales, the probability to introduce an eco-label is positively signicant. The same does
not hold for the presence of a green price premium proxied by the population share below
45 years old. This probably comes from the fact that it is an imperfect proxy, since most
high income countries with an eco-label in place have fewer young adult people relative to
developing countries. Results show that economies displaying a relative production cost ad-
vantage through previous environmental preferences experience, innovation and a high share
in high-technology exports are more inclined towards adopting a voluntary environmental
program. This result is in line with Grolleau & El Harbi (2008), who nds that economies
characterized with higher technological innovation capacities use the eco-labelling scheme as
a tool to enhance and reinforce their innovation potential. In fact, there is some kind of
"path dependency" that shapes the di¤usion of environment friendly organizational innova-
tions through ISO14001 certicates leading ultimately and more easily to the adoption of an
eco-label program. Although there seems to be a substitutive relationship between the adop-
tion of an eco-label and the average manufacturing tari¤, it is not statistically signicant.
Finally, nations which are closer to each other in economic and geographical terms display
a higher probability of adopting an eco-label program. Thus, hypothesis 1 and 2 related to
the interdependence nature of the eco-label decision are supported.
In comparison with the classical probit model, there are major di¤erences in terms of av-
erage coe¢ cients and marginal e¤ects, the spatial direct marginal e¤ects being theoretically
equivalent to the standard marginal e¤ects. Beside the fact that the number of explanatory
variables signicantly di¤erent from zero is higher in the spatial probit estimation, account-
ing for spatial dependence usually yields higher average estimates but lower average direct
marginal e¤ects in absolute value. This is mainly due to a larger average posterior of the
constant in the spatial probit and a rate of decay relatively faster of the spatial dependence.
This also explains why the indirect e¤ects, which can be interpreted as the probabilistic im-
pact of a rise in the neighborhood of a given explanatory variable on the eco-label decision,
are always smaller than the direct e¤ects. The largest average total e¤ects are associated
with a high number of ISO14001 certicates, a strong level of economic development and
potentially large scale e¤ects.
In order to further investigate the impact of interdependence, it can be of interest to
compare the predictive power of the spatial probit model with respect to the standard
probit model, because the McFadden pseudo R2 can be misleading. As in most empir-
ical studies considering a probit framework, I assume that the model is able to predict
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the eco-label adoption (i.e. Yi = 1) when the predicted probability is equal to or larger
than 50 percent. In the benchmark sample, the proportion of countries having introduced
an eco-label program is about 33:33 percent. The fact that the sample is unbalanced makes
any prediction more di¢ cult. Yet, evidence suggests that accounting for spatial dependence
denitively increases the explanatory power of the model. The standard probit model predicts
90:78 percent of the cases correctly, while its spatial extension displays a higher predictive
power with 94:33 percent. Among the eco-label adopters, 85:11 percent are also predicted
correctly by the spatial model and only 78:72 percent by the simple probit model. Once again,
this highlights the importance of accounting for interdependence in the eco-label adoption.
Interestingly, according to the spatial probit model, some less developed countries should not
have implemented an eco-label (e.g. Indonesia, Russia, Ukraine,... ), while Chile should have
adopted one. Actually Chile was among the rst to introduce an eco-label in the forestry
industry (CERTFOR). Moreover, at the end of 2009 the Chilean government proposed a bill
that require producers, distributors and importers to label goods with information on the
environmental impacts posed by their products.
Table 4: Models Predictive Power
Standard Probit Model Spatial Probit Model
Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
Eco-label No Eco-label Eco-label No Eco-label Total
Observed Ecolabel 37 10 40 7 47
Observed No Eco-label 3 91 1 93 94
Total 40 101 41 100 141
6 Robustness Check
In order to investigate the robustness of the previous ndings, several sensitivity analysis are
performed. First, I check if the estimates are sensitive to a modication of the Markov Chain
Monte Carlo settings. Second, di¤erent expressions of the spatial weight matrix are consid-
ered. Last but not least, I estimate the spatial error and Durbin version of the benchmark
model in order to account for some potential omission variables. Overall, the conclusions
based on the benchmark model prevail and conrm the existence of spatial dependence in
the eco-label decision.
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6.1 MCMCs setting
Several Monte Carlo studies showed that the estimation of non-linear probability models can
be sensitive to the degree of heteroskedasticity of the disturbances. The benchmark results
were obtained under the following variances prior  (4=vi) v iid 2 (4). Therefore, in order
to check the robustness of the main results, I re-estimate the model by setting a di¤erent
value for the hyperparameter r, either assuming the prior distribution is more asymmetric
and skewed (r = 3) or the prior distribution is symmetric (r = 10). I also estimate the
model under the assumption of no heteroskedasticity in the residualsvariance, i.e. vi = 1,
i = 1; :::; N .
To save space, I only report in Table 5 the results of the heteroskedastic and asymmetric
versus the symmetric and homoskedastic case. Overall, the results remain qualitatively sim-
ilar. Higher or lower skewness parameter of the variance 2 distribution does not alter the
ndings. The decision to introduce an ecological label is still spatially dependent. However
when k = 3, the results are more sensitive, because the algorithm breaks down when a smaller
value for the hyperparameter r is considered (r = 2). In any case, most of the marginal esti-
mates remain in the same range as in the benchmark, suggesting that the results are robust
to an alteration of the MCMCs algorithm. This might be surprising, since a simple t-test
rejects the hypothesis that each average estimated individual variance term (bvi) is equal to
1. Although not reported, but available upon request, the results are also robust to a change
in the initial value of the spatial autoregressive parameter and the covariance matrix of the
prior distribution of .
6.2 Spatial Weight Matrices
In order to shed light on the relative intensity of interdependence in the eco-label decision,
I re-estimate the model using four alternative spatial weighting matrix W. First, I consider
the simple inverse bilateral distance which allocates a positive weight to all countries, includ-
ing very remote ones. In fact, strategic dependence can be e¤ective, even beyond its own
geographical region. The corresponding spatial weight matrix is dened as follows:
wij =
8<: 1distanceij if i 6= j0 if i = j
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A second spatial weight matrix is constructed based on the minimum political distance data-
base built by Gleditsch & Ward (2001). The main reason to consider this measure is that the
type of eco-labels considered in this study are in most cases the result of a political decision.
In addition, empirical evidence suggests that political interests are a major determinant in
the attitude towards preventing environmental damage. This political distance measure is
based on the minimum geographical distances for all governments within 950 kilometers of
each other in the year 2000. Note that the structure of this political distance measure is
not simply geographical. For instance, according to Gleditsch & Ward, there is no political
inuence between Canada and USA:
wij =
8<: 1political distanceij if i 6= j and distanceij  950 km0 if i = j
Third, I consider a spatial weight matrix based on the average bilateral trade between 1995-
2000 to explicitly account for trade intensity between countries. Accordingly, strategic depen-
dence should be higher with countries characterized by high trade intensity between them:
wij =
8<: tradeij if i 6= j0 if i = j
However, trade intensity might be a measure of strategic interdependence too broad, because
despite important trade ows, countries can in reality share small strategic interdependence
if each one is specialized in di¤erent type of products. That is why, following Cao & Prakash
(2009), the last spatial weight matrix is constructed based on countriesexport structural
equivalence. The export prole corresponds to the correlation between manufacturing exports
of country i and j at both bilateral and sector levels to the remaining economic partners18 .
A structural equivalenceij close to 1 implies that country i and j export the same type of
goods to the same other partner countries. In other words, economy i and j are competitors
since they export similar products to the same foreign markets. Therefore, one can expect
strategic interactions to be stronger between countries in competition:
wij =
8<: structural equivalenceij if i 6= j0 if i = j
18Based on the United Nations Standard International Trade Classication, four manufacturing sectors
are considered: (1) chemical and related products; (2) manufactured goods; (3) machinery and transport
equipment: (4) miscellaneous manufactured articles.
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Results given in Table 6 are qualitatively similar in terms of direct e¤ect independently of
the spatial weight considered. This is additional evidence of the robustness of the benchmark
results. The di¤erences in the marginal indirect e¤ects (and thus total e¤ects) are mainly
due to the average value taken by the posterior distribution of the spatial autoregressive
parameter. For instance, the spatial lag associated with the inverse geographical distance
weight matrix is larger than any other spatial scheme. This suggests that spatial interac-
tions in the eco-label decision are not bounded within their own geographical region. For
instance, the Japanese government will not only consider the actions of its Asian neighbors,
but also pay attention to European nations as well as the United States. This is partially
conrmed when the spatial lag is based on structural export equivalence. As one expected,
strategic dependence goes beyond pure geographical and political distances and can include
trade competition among structural equivalent economies. In other words, two countries
close geographically and trading intensively but whose manufacturing industries are struc-
turally di¤erent will not share a strong strategic interaction in the decision to implement an
eco-labelling scheme (e.g. one country trades food goods, while the other one trades man-
ufacturing goods). This could partially explain why the spatial autoregressive is relatively
small with trade intensity. The other reason might be due the fact that the spatial weight
matrix with bilateral trade is no longer strictly exogenous (but potentially predetermined).
Yet the main ndings remain almost unchanged, except that the substitutive relationship
between the average manufacturing tari¤ and the decision to introduce an eco-label is now
statistically signicant. This is in line with the view that eco-label might promote non-trade
tari¤ barriers. But since this nding is not robust, this suggests that the underlying protec-
tionist motivation behind the implementation of an eco-labelling scheme is not as strong as
least developed countries might fear.
6.3 Spatial Error and Durbin Models
Due to data availability, it is extremely di¢ cult to consider other potential explanatory
variables without reducing drastically the sample size19 . By reducing the number of countries,
not only is the notion of interdependence altered, but the MCMC algorithm will yield less
e¢ cient estimates. That is why, I restrict myself to estimate an extended version of the
benchmark model, known as the spatial Durbin model, to account for potential additional
spatial variables omission.
19Several other specications were estimated that included GDP per capita squared, European Union
dummy, ... Although those results lead to the same conclusion, they su¤er from high collinearity and lack
of converge in the MCMC estimation. Other explantory variables, like innovation index or corruption index
could not have been included as they cover a limited number of countries.
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Beside the spatial lag, spatial dependence can also be specied in the error term. The
spatial error model whose errors are spatially correlated reads as:
Y? = X + e
e = We + u
Estimation of the spatially autocorrelated error model through the MCMC method is very
similar to the spatial lag model, because the prior of each parameter is dened independently
of each other. The marginal e¤ects in a spatial error model are computed as follows:
bijr = hXbi
i
=bti br=bti
where bti = b2Pi b!2ij with !ij being the ijth elements of the matrix (I   W) 1 u.
Ignoring spatial error dependence yields an omitted variable bias, when the omitted vari-
ables are spatially dependent. The issue is that the spatial lag might capture uncorrected
spatial dependence related to the error term. Despite its econometric foundation, there is
no direct economic interpretation of the expected sign of the spatial error term. As high-
lighted by Pace and LeSage (2007), the spatial Durbin model has the advantage of reducing
spatially dependent omitted variable bias and having a direct economic interpretation. The
spatial Durbin model corresponds to the extension of the benchmark model which includes
the spatially weighted average of the dependent variable (WY) as well as the explanatory
variables beside the constant term (WXnc):
Y? = WY? + X +WXnc + u
Note that in the spatial Durbin model, the spatial e¤ects are modied to account for the
presence of the spatial covariates:.
bijr = h(IN   bW) 1 Xb +WXncbi
i
=bsi h
(IN   bW) 1i
ij
br + h(IN   bW) 1 Wi
ij
br =bsi
One important drawback of the spatial Durbin model is the introduction of additional
collinearity as it is the case here. As a consequence, there are some convergence issues.
That is why, some of the MCMC settings are modied. In particular, the number of burn-in
and draws are set to 20; 000 and 80; 000, respectively, because the posterior distribution of
the spatial lag is not converging with a smaller number of draws.
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Table 7 reports the results of the spatial error and Durbin probit models with the negative
exponential distance weighting scheme. In comparison with the spatial autoregressive model,
the spatially autocorrelated error model yields higher posterior mean for each parameter,
including the spatial error variable
b = 0:95. As a consequence, the marginal e¤ects are
larger than the direct e¤ects in the benchmark model. Since the errors seems to be spatially
correlated, it might be justied to consider the spatial Durbin model to control for the poten-
tial omitted variable bias in the spatial error. As mentioned previously, the spatial Durbin
model su¤ers from multicollinearity, which explains why the posterior mean of most vari-
ables is higher (in particular the political and civil liberties index). Most spatial covariates,
which are statistically signicant, implies positive externalities on the decision to introduce
an eco-label. In other words, the average government will not only look if its partners have
implemented an eco-labelling scheme, but also consider their economic characteristics. As
a consequence, these positive spillovers stemming from neighborhood characteristics lead to
higher indirect marginal e¤ects in absolute value for most explanatory variables. Finally,
accounting for spatial dependence in the error term yields a negative and signicant spatial
autoregressive coe¢ cient. The results suggest now that the average country behaves as a
leader and implement an eco-labelling scheme if its partners dont have or dont plan on
introducing one.
7 Conclusion
The decision of a government to introduce an eco-labelling scheme program depends on
many factors. One potential determinant, usually omitted in empirical literature, is the
existence of interdependence in the adoptions decision. To address this issue, a limited
dependent variable spatial probit model is estimated through a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
method using a joint update sampler algorithm. In comparison with an aspatial specication,
accounting for the spatial dependence leads to a higher explanatory power of the model. The
main ndings indicate that the probability for a government to introduce an eco-labelling
scheme is positively related to the economys stage of development decision, the existence
of potential scale e¤ects as well as a relative production cost advantage through innovation.
In addition, there is robust evidence that suggests that the eco-label adoption is a strategic
decision with respect to other countriesdecision. Obviously, in order to reach a denitive
conclusion about the view that eco-label might be used as non-tari¤ trade barrier, one should
be able to demonstrate that the eco-label has lead to a decrease in the imports level of the
same type of good. Unfortunately, the lack of information makes it di¢ cult to empirically
highlight this mechanism.
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Nevertheless, the empirical evidence provided here suggests that in order for an eco-label
program to be as transparent and unbiased as possible and thus avoid any trade barrier
e¤ects, harmonization in the standards, greater transparency in the certication awarding
and mutual recognition in eco-labelling schemes are needed. Obviously, these changes cannot
be achieved so easily. Mainly because it does not only involve national governments but also
the implicated industries and agencies in both developed and developing countries.
Future research should account for the time dynamic in the eco-label program implemen-
tation and thus consider a dynamic extension of the spatial probit model for several reasons.
First, the starting phase of most eco-labelling schemes is associated with procedural and
methodological uncertainties that could be even more important and lasting in developing
countries. Second, most current eco-labels in developed countries are able to exist because
of subsidies. A slowed economy or a change in environmental policy could limit the sources
of subsidies (e.g. individual supports, foundations, governments) a¤ecting the functioning of
eco-label programs. Third, the important consolidation and vertical integration within and
between most segments of the market chains, that have been taken place during the past 30
years, can also alter the industry market structure and a¤ect the eco-labelling schemes. Last
but not least, the potential oversupply of eco-labels may prevent consumption of environ-
mentally friendly products because of information congestion. This could ultimately lead to
the elimination of some eco-labelling schemes that cannot face competition among other eco-
labels. Hopefully, with the development of better disaggregated data on eco-labelled trade
ows, additional investigation will help to disentangle the di¤erent e¤ects that are at play
between eco-labels and international trade.
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8 Appendices
8.A Relative Algorithms Performance
Performance relative to Joint Update with Metropolis-Hastings
Iterative Update with Iterative Update with
Geweke & Rodriguez-Yam et al. &
Metropolis-Hastings Metropolis-Hastings
Dependence Param. Dependence Param.
Observations Factor Distance Factor Distance
250 1.102 0.659 1.168 0.935
500 1.287 0.724 1.378 0.974
750 1.397 0.797 1.387 1.031
1000 1.569 0.869 1.454 1.124
Performance relative to Joint Update with numerical integration
Iterative Update with Iterative Update with
Geweke & Rodriguez-Yam et al. &
Numerical Integration Numerical Integration
Dependence Param. Dependence Param.
Observations Factor Distance Factor Distance
250 1.256 0.684 1.234 0.950
500 1.274 0.745 1.233 0.976
750 1.455 0.818 1.276 1.022
1000 1.469 0.879 1.290 1.064
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8.B Manufactured Multi-products Eco-Label List
National Supranational National Supranational
Country Eco-label Eco-label Country Eco-label Eco-label
Australia 1991 Korea, Rep. 1992
Austria 1990 1992z Latvia 2004z
Belgium 1992z Liechtenstein 1992z
Brazil 1992 Lithuania 2001 2004z
Bulgaria 2007z Luxembourg 1992 1992z
Canada 1988 Malaysia 1996
China 1993 Malta 2004z
Croatia 1993 Netherlands 1992 1992z
Cyprus 2004z New Zealand 1990
Czech Republic 1993 2004z Norway 1989y, 1992z
Denmark 1989y, 1992z Philippines 2001
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1999 Poland 2004 2004z
Estonia 2004z Portugal 1992z
Finland 1989y, 1992z Romania 2007z
France 1992 1992z Russian Federation 2007
Germany 1977 1992z Singapore 1992
Greece 1992z Slovak Republic 1996 1996z
Hong Kong, China 2000 Slovenia 2004z
Hungary 1994 1994z Spain 1994 1992z
Iceland 1989y, 1992z Sweden 1989 1989y, 1992z
India 1991 Switzerland 2000
Indonesia 1994 Taiwan 1992
Ireland 1992z Thailand 1994
Israel 1993 Ukraine 2002
Italy 1992z United Kingdom 1992z
Japan 1989 United States 1988
Note: y Nordic Swan; z EU Eco-labelling
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8.D Country List
Albania Denmark Kuwait Romania
Algeria Djibouti Kyrgyz Republic Russian Federation
Angola Dominican Republic Lao PDR Rwanda
Argentina Ecuador Latvia Saudi Arabia
Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep. Lebanon Senegal
Australia El Salvador Lithuania Sierra Leone
Austria Estonia Macedonia, FYR Slovak Republic
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Madagascar Slovenia
Bangladesh Finland Malawi South Africa
Belarus France Malaysia Spain
Belgium-Luxembourg Gabon Mali Sri Lanka
Belize Georgia Mauritania Sudan
Benin Germany Mauritius Swaziland
Bolivia Ghana Mexico Sweden
Bosnia and Herzegovina Greece Moldova Switzerland
Botswana Guatemala Mongolia Syrian Arab Republic
Brazil Guinea Morocco Tajikistan
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Tanzania
Burkina Faso Guyana Namibia Thailand
Burundi Honduras Nepal Togo
Cambodia Hong Kong, China Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon Hungary New Zealand Tunisia
Canada Iceland Nicaragua Turkey
Central African Republic India Niger Turkmenistan
Chad Indonesia Nigeria Uganda
Chile Iran, Islamic Rep. Norway Ukraine
China Ireland Oman United Arab Emirates
Colombia Israel Pakistan United Kingdom
Congo, Dem. Rep. Italy Panama United States
Congo, Rep. Jamaica Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Costa Rica Japan Paraguay Uzbekistan
Croatia Jordan Peru Venezuela, RB
Cyprus Kazakhstan Philippines Vietnam
Czech Republic Kenya Poland Yemen, Rep.
Côte dIvoire Korea, Rep. Portugal Zambia
Zimbabwe
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8.E Data Sources
Factors Variable Expected sign Source
Stage of development Real GDP Per Capita + WDI 2007
Economic E¢ ciency Civil And Political Liberties Index + Freedom House
Pollution Pressure SO2 Emission level + EDGAR
Scale E¤ect Manufacture Value Added + WDI 2007
Price Premium Population Below 45 Years Old + U.S. Census Bureau
Environmental Experience International Environmental Treaties + ENTRI
Innovation High Technology Exports + WDI 2007
Innovation ISO14001 Certicates + ISO
Non-Tari¤ Barriers Manufacturing Tari¤s -/+ WDI 2007
Spatial Dependence Geographical Distance -/+ CEPII
Spatial Dependence Political Distance -/+ Gleditsch Ward (2001)
Spatial Dependence Bilateral Trade Flows/Structural Equivalence -/+ UN Comtrade
Note: Non spatial data is averaged over 2003-2005, except SO2 emission data only available for 2000.
8.F Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Moran I
Eco-label 141 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.57***
Real GDP per capita 141 8967.93 13800.01 38.76 62812.54 0.54***
So2 emissions 141 91.78 13.29 0 99.8 0.2***
Political and civil liberties 141 -3.37 1.85 -7 -1 0.48***
Population share below 45 years old 141 41.09 4.88 31.17 65.05 0.48***
Environmental treaties 141 41.35 20.45 4 104 0.68***
Manufacture value-added 141 15.19 7.57 2.3 42 0.34***
High-technology exports 141 0.09 0.12 0 0.71 0.16***
ISO14001 certicates 141 775.67 2565.73 0 21881 0.26***
Manufacture tari¤ 141 8.63 5.57 0 31.85 0.44***
Note: The Moran statistics tests the absence of spatial autocorrelation.
, and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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